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directed us to believe, what could then be said of it? If it is put forward
as the basis on which to found a system of metaphysics, it must clearly,
I think, be condemned as worthless. The most that could be said against
the denial of it would be that, if that denial was true, the world would be
a wicked and miserable place. And what right have we to take this as a
reductio ad absurdum? How do we know that the world is not a wicked
and miserable place? It is all very well for our aspirations after virtue
and happiness to say that they must live. But what if the universe replies
that it does not see the necessity? It can scarcely be denied that it has the
power to act on its convictions.
76. The question takes a very different form, however, if we regard
an idealist system of metaphysics as being already demonstrated. For if
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology/65
the universe is proved to be rational, and we can further prove that it
could not be rational unless a certain proposition be true, it will, of
course, be perfectly logical to conclude that the proposition must be
true. Now Hegel unquestionably holds the Absolute to be an harmoni-
ous whole. And we saw reason to believe, in the last chapter, that the
fundamental differentiations of the Absolute were all persons, and that
the whole nature of the Absolute is adequately expressed in the con-
scious relations between persons. If therefore, it can be proved that the
consciousness of the personality of the Absolute is essential to harmoni-
ous conscious relations between the persons who compose it, we should
have a good ground for believing in the personality of the Absolute.46
Now sin and misery are incompatible with the harmony of conscious
beings. If they are to be harmonious they must be virtuous and happy
or else in some higher state which transcends and includes virtue and
happiness. And so if the consciousness of the personality of the Abso-
lute was shown to be essential to the virtue and happiness of finite per-
sons, we could, on the basis of Hegel s philosophy, legitimately con-
clude that the Absolute was a person.
But how can the consciousness of the personality of the Absolute be
shown to be essential to the virtue and happiness of finite persons? It
would not suffice if it were shown to be essential for the virtue and
happiness of every human being who is now living, or who has lived
since the beginning of history. For what must be shown is that, without
the belief in a personal Absolute, finite persons could not be perfectly
virtuous and happy. And the fact that no person has been so yet, if it
were a fact, would prove nothing of the sort. We are very far as yet from
perfection. And so we continually make demands on reality which are
so far from being conditions of perfect and harmonious existence, that,
if realised, they would utterly destroy all harmony. In our ignorance we
suppose our happiness to lie in what could only lead to our misery, we
seek as a help what would prove a hindrance. That this is so in many
cases is one of the common-places of moralists. Now, even if the belief
in the personality of the Absolute was invariably requisite, as far as our
experience reached, to happiness or virtue, how can we tell that this is
not one of those cases? How can we tell that wiser men would not find
greater happiness elsewhere, that better men would not rise without its
aid to loftier virtue? We may not be able to say positively that they
would, but that is not sufficient. If we are to be able to deduce, in this
way, the personality of the Absolute, we must be able to say positively
66/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
that they would not.
77. It is superfluous to point out, moreover, that mankind has by no
means been unanimous in demanding a personal God. Neither Brah-
manism nor Buddhism makes the Supreme Being personal, but each of
them holds that it is possible for men to reach a state of perfect blessed-
ness. And, in the western world, many wise men have been both virtu-
ous and happy, who denied the personality of God. It is sufficient to
mention Spinoza and Hume. I am far from suggesting that we have any
reason, on such inductions as these facts would open to us, to conclude
that the denial of God s personality tends to greater virtue or happiness
than its assertion. But I think that they are conclusive against any at-
tempt to prove that the assertion always leads to greater virtue or happi-
ness than the denial.
78. The only way in which we could hope to prove that the con-
sciousness of the personality of the Absolute was essential either to
perfect virtue or to perfect happiness would be by an argument a priori.
For we are still too far removed from perfect virtue and happiness, for
any inductions from our present condition to have the least value. If,
however, we could by an a priori argument so determine the nature of a
perfect finite being as to include, as a necessary element in its perfec-
tion, the consciousness of a personal Absolute, we should then know
that the personality of the Absolute was an essential characteristic of a
perfect universe, and therefore, on the basis of Hegel s idealism, might
be accepted as true.
But, so far as I know, no attempt has been made to do this. And it is
not easy to see on what ground such a demonstration could be based. Of
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