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needed to channel relevant components of their foreign and security policies
through the EU. For this to occur, they must set common goals and agree on
how to achieve these goals (Toje 2005: 118). In the first decade after the cre-
ation of the CFSP, however, the EU member states only agreed on common
strategies on a very limited number of issues (regarding Russia, the Ukraine and
the Mediterranean region) and a few military missions. The EU initiated three of
these missions (Operation Concordia in Macedonia, Operation Artemis in
Congo and Operation Althea in Bosnia), while others were taken over from
NATO or the UN.8 As in the case of the ESDP, a crisis among the major EU
member states was required to create the incentives for creating a common strat-
egy. Discussions between the United States and its European allies over a poten-
tial invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted in a public and dramatic split between EU
members. Britain and the majority of the smaller EU member states allied with
the United States, whereas Germany and France opposed the invasion. Follow-
ing this crisis, the High Representative of EU Foreign and Security Policy,
Javier Solana, was commissioned by the Council to write a strategic concept.
Does the ESS allow the EU to act independently of the United States in mili-
tary affairs? The answer is no. The European Security Strategy stresses the con-
tinued importance of the transatlantic relationship, and it does not specify the
means to act independently. As noted by Simon Duke, the ESS seems more like
an inspirational sketch than a full-fledged security strategy specifying actual
goals and the means necessary to fulfil them (2004: 460). [I]t does not really
address questions as to when, where and for what reasons, and to what extent the
European Union should use force (Wyllie 2006: 174; Toje 2005: 120 121). The
ESS identifies five key threats : terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime (European
Council: I The Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats), but
[w]hich threats are the most salient, and which should be tackled first and with
what degree of urgency is not addressed (Wyllie 2006: 172 173). Discussing
Europe 79
the strategic objectives of the EU, the document notes that the Union has been
active in tackling terrorism, proliferation and regional conflicts and that
[c]onflict and threat prevention cannot start too early (European Council 2003:
II Strategic objectives). The ESS notes the importance of the EU neighbourhood
policies, but places the greatest explicit emphasis on the importance of effective
multilateralism , where international organizations, regimes and treaties [are]
effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must
therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken (2003: II Strategic object-
ives). When it comes to policy implications, the document is general and
without concrete advice. It talks about being more active , more capable ,
more coherent and working with partners . It argues that [t]here are few if
any problems we can deal with on our own and stresses that [t]he transatlantic
relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the
United States can be a formidable force for good in the world (European
Council 2003: III Policy implications for Europe). Even though European
leaders have since followed up on these issues most notably regarding terror-
ism they have failed to formulate concrete and operational policies and largely
attempted to avoid controversial issues such as UN Security Council reform and
Iraq, which would have proved ideal testing grounds for the general ESS
statements.
Even if the ESS demonstrates neither the intention nor the capability of the
Europeans to act alone, it might be argued that it represents a stage in a gradual
development towards a more independent Europe by signalling a different set of
goals and means than the National Security Strategy of the United States. If this
is the case, it could point towards the beginning of soft European balancing of
the United States. To what extent do we find evidence of this aspect of soft bal-
ancing in the ESS? In order to answer this question, we must examine the Amer-
ican National Security Strategy more closely.
The main goals of the American National Security Strategy presented in 2002
are to preserve the security and superpower status of the United States and to
defend the liberal ideology of the United States and its allies against its enemies.
In the words of the security strategy: to create a balance of power that favours
freedom . These goals were viewed as complementary, because using
America s unprecedented power to remake the world in America s image
(Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 123) would allow America and its allies to create a
world of states committed to peace and freedom with no inherent conflicts of
interest. While stressing the need to continue to cooperate with other states to
contain the spread of dangerous technologies to so-called rogue states, this strat-
egy also stressed the American intention to act against emerging threats even
before they are fully formed and that the United States would not hesitate to act
unilaterally if necessary.
The ESS generally agrees with the American view of the present world order
and its most dangerous threats. It recognizes the advent of a new strategic area
in the form of threats that are more diverse, less visible and less predictable
than in the past (Asmus 2006: 23). In contrast to Cold War security strategy,
80 Europe
both documents are concerned with security threats from state and non-state
actors alike rather than territorial defence. Both documents essentially focus on
the same threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states and
regional conflicts, although the Americans view terrorism as a much more
urgent threat and the Europeans emphasize the importance of organized crime
along with the other threats. As noted in a recent analysis, the NSS and the ESS
share a generally common view of the nature of new security threats, a refusal to
accept the international status quo, and a determination to change it (Dan-
nreuther and Peterson 2006: 2). Perhaps most radically, the EU acknowledges
that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and
threat prevention cannot start too early (ESS 2003: II Strategic Objectives).
There are differences as well. The two documents demonstrate the dissimilar
strategic outlooks of a global superpower, the United States, and regional
powers, the major EU countries. Whereas the European Security Strategy (ESS)
places special emphasis on building security in the EU neighbourhood, the NSS
points to no region of specific importance. The two strategies also reflect the dif-
ferences between a soft security actor such as the EU and a security actor with
a wide range of capabilities such as the United States. The ESS emphasizes the
need for an international order based on effective multilateralism (European
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